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Abstract
The determinants of government responsiveness to its citizens is a
key issue in political economy. Here we develop a model based on
the solution of political agency problems. Having a more
informed an politically active electorate strengthens incentives for
governments to be responsive. This suggests that there is a role
both for democratic institutions and the mass media in ensuring
that the preferences of citizens are reflected in policy. The ideas
behind the model are tested on panel data from India. We show
that public food distribution and calamity relief expenditure are
greater, controlling for shocks, where governments face greater
electoral accountability and where newspaper circulation is
highest.
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1 Introduction
Understanding what makes government responsive to citizens needs is a key issue in
political economy. It is particularly poignant in low-income countries where, in the
absence of market opportunities, vulnerable populations rely on state action for their
survival. A key issue is then what institutions  economic, social and political  can
be built to enhance the eﬀectiveness of the state in social protection. This paper lays
out a framework for thinking about the issues and explores its empirical implications
in an Indian context. Among other things, the approach highlights the importance
of information ßows about policy actions in increasing government responsiveness,
particularly the role of mass media in creating an incentive for governments to respond
to citizens needs.
There is a large literature that emphasizes why the poor and vulnerable may
not obtain the full attention of politicians even in a democracy where they have
numerical strength. These groups are typically poorly informed and are generally
less inclined to vote than richer and better educated citizens. A key question then is
what institutions and mechanisms enable vulnerable citizens to have their preferences
represented in policy. The approach laid out here does not rely on the vulnerable
being in a majority for them to obtain political power. What is key is that they have
enough electoral power to swing outcomes, otherwise politicians will not have an
incentive to be responsive to their demands. However, this is not enough. In order to
exercise their electoral power they must also perceive diﬀerences between candidates
or parties as regards responsiveness. Mass media can play a key role here by enabling
vulnerable citizens to monitor the actions of incumbents. This should give them some
sense of about which politicians will protect them in the future and can be used as
the basis of their voting decisions. Media development can therefore considerably
strengthen incentives for incumbents to build reputations for being responsive as an
informed electorate will have much greater power to punish unresponsive candidates
than an uninformed electorate. Mass media thus capitalizes upon shared vulnerability
among poor voters to ensure that they get receive greater policy attention.
It has long been recognized that the quality of government policy requires the de-
velopment of key institutions. There is long tradition among social thinkers including
Rousseau, Smith, Hobbes, Locke, Madison, Jeﬀerson and Mill who have argued that
press freedom is essential for citizens to make intelligent and well-grounded decisions
about public aﬀairs. The idea that a key role of the press is to inform the electorate
is central to the political science literature on the role of mass media.1 Emphasis
on the role of the media is also in tune with the idea that a strong civil society is
an important aspect of economic development. The recent resurgence of interest in
political economy, however, has paid little attention to the role of news media in
inßuencing policy.2 There is also no Þrm empirical evidence in the literature of a link
1See, for example, Brians and Wattenberg [1996] and Mondak [1995].
2Stromberg [2000] being a key exception.
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between media development and public policy.
In this paper we develop a model where mass media has a role in providing
information that mitigates political agency problems. Having a more informed and
politically active electorate strengthens incentives for governments to be responsive to
the needs of vulnerable citizens. Using panel data for Indian states over the 1958-1992
period we then demonstrate that there is a robust link between media development
and government responsiveness.
India is an interesting and important context for analyzing the political economy of
government responsiveness. First, there are measurable shocks, such as droughts and
ßoods, which hit vulnerable populations and vary over space and time. We exploit
this variation in a panel of states between 1958 to 1992 to look at the factors that aﬀect
how responsive state governments are to these shocks. Second, state level programs
allocate relief to populations that experience shocks. The relief measures we study
include public food distribution and calamity relief expenditure. The institutions
that administer relief are fairly similar across states  what diﬀers is the political will
to exploit them. As India is a federal democracy this allows us to study how political
variables aﬀect responsiveness. Third, India has a relatively free and independent
press among countries at a similar level of economic development. Nonetheless, there
are diﬀerences in newspaper circulation across the states. This variation will allow
us to consider the role of news media in promoting government responsiveness.
We begin by showing that diﬀerences in government responsiveness are only
weakly related to economic development of Indian states. However, politics does
seem to matter. States that have higher historical turnout exhibit greater respon-
siveness to droughts and ßoods. We also Þnd that the level of political competition
and timing of elections exerts some inßuence on responsiveness. Finally we show
that newspaper circulation is strongly and positively correlated with government re-
sponsiveness. Moreover, this comes primarily from publications that are not in the
dominant languages  Hindi or English. This is consistent with the idea that regional
presses play a key role in forcing state governments to respond to shocks.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section lays out
a theoretical structure through which to view the results. Section three describes
the institutional context for the empirical test. Section four describes the data and
methodology we employ to test the main ideas behind the model and presents the
results. Section Þve concludes.
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2 The Model
2.1 The Environment
There is a continuum of citizens of size one who care about two issues: ideology
and social protection.3 There are two time periods and no discounting. Citizens
have a preferred ideology which we label as left and right: k ∈ {L,R}. A citizen
of type k receives a payoﬀ φkl from a policy maker of ideology l. We assume that
φLL − φLR = φRR − φRL = λ > 0, where λ is a measure of ideological polarization.
A fraction of the citizens is vulnerable to shocks and care about social protection.
Let j ∈ {v, n} denote a citizens vulnerability where v stands for vulnerable and n
for non-vulnerable. In each period, a fraction β ∈
h
β, 1
i
of the vulnerable citizens
get hit by a shock to their consumption. We assume that each vulnerable citizen is
equally likely to experience a shock so that
1+β
2
is the probability that any citizen is
hit. The per-period utility function of a citizen of preference type (k, j) is y−fδjt+φkl
with δjt = 1 if j experiences a shock and f > 0 denotes the size of the shock.
The fraction of citizens of type (k, j) is denoted γkj . We let γ
k = γkn+γ
k
v denote the
fraction of the population with ideology k and γj = γ
L
j + γ
R
j the fraction with shock
vulnerability j. We assume throughout that there are enough vulnerable citizens so
that γkv >
¯¯¯
γL − γR
¯¯¯
for k ∈ {L,R}. This also requires that there be real political
competition with the relative fractions of left- and right-wing citizens not being too
far apart.
The government can act to protect the vulnerable citizens from the endowment
shock. For simplicity, we assume that there are only two policies: protection (χ = 1)
and non-protection (χ = 0). If the government chooses protection, this completely
neutralizes the eﬀect of the endowment shock for all of the vulnerable citizens. The
entire cost of protecting the citizens is assumed to be borne by the policy maker.4
There are two possible (per capita) costs of protection: high (cH) and low (cL) with
cL < cH . The shock is realized at the same time as β is revealed and is low with proba-
bility ρ.We assume that the cost realization is private information to the government
and that βcH > λ > βcL.
2.2 Policy Determination
There are two parties, denoted A and B, that put up candidates for public oﬃce. Each
party is comprised of a subset of non-vulnerable citizens with identical ideological
preferences  party A comprises left-wingers and party B right-wingers. Candidates
are party members and cannot commit to policies ahead of time. Each candidate is
3Ideology should be thought of as a catch-all for all government activity other than social pro-
tection.
4This is best thought of as being an eﬀort rather than a Þnancial cost  the latter falling on all
citizens. If the cost aﬀects taxes, then it would be possible for citizens to infer something about it.
The analysis would go through providing taxes were not fully revealing of the cost shock.
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one of two types: compassionate (C) or selÞsh (S) denoted by i ∈ {C,S}. This char-
acteristic is relevant only if the candidate wins oﬃce and is private information to the
winning candidate. Compassionate policy makers protect the vulnerable regardless
of the cost. SelÞsh policy makers will provide social protection only if it is in their
interest to do so. Let p denote the probability that any randomly selected policy
maker of either ideology is compassionate.
Citizens who have been hit by a shock in period one observe the governments re-
sponse. Whether it is observed by the remaining group of vulnerable citizens depends
upon development of the media. We model this by assuming that a fraction m of
the vulnerable citizens is informed about government actions regardless of whether
they experience a shock. Thus, the fraction of informed vulnerable citizens in period
one is (m+ (1−m)β1) γv.
Electoral outcomes are also subject to shocks which can be interpreted as turnout
shocks or uncertain changes in the electorate due to variations in the composition of
the voting population over time. This is assumed to guarantee a range of conditions
under which a policy maker must act without knowing whether or not he will win
or lose a future election for sure. Let ωk be the advantage that party A has in the
election in terms of underlying support. Then, we suppose that there is a pro-left
shock ε with distribution function H (ε) where ε ∈ [−E,E] such that party A wins if
and only ω + ε > 0. We assume that H (·) is symmetric and that H (0) = 1
2
. Thus,
the probability that party A wins is 1 if ω > E and zero if ω < −E and 1−H (−ω)
otherwise. Throughout, we assume that H (− (γL − γR)) ∈ (0, 1), which says that on
a straight ideological Þght, both parties have a positive chance of winning.
The timing of the policy process is as follows:
1. Parties choose their period one candidates.
2. Voters choose the period one incumbent.
3. Nature determines the period one shock (β1),whether the policy maker is com-
passionate, and the cost of action (c1).
4. The winning candidate chooses period one policy.
5. Parties choose their period two candidates.
6. Voters choose the period two incumbent.
7. Period two shock (β2) and cost of action (c2) . If the policy maker is new,
nature also determines whether or not he is compassionate.
8. The winning candidate chooses period two policy.
Parties are assumed to correctly calculate the election probabilities associated
with diﬀerent candidate pairs and take them into account when choosing candidates.
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Any election gives rise to a game between the two parties. Each partys strategy
is the type of candidate it selects and its strategy set is the set of possible citizen
types. Each partys payoﬀ from any strategy pair is determined by the probability
its candidate wins and its objective function. An equilibrium of the game in any
time period is a pair of candidate choices, one for each party, that are mutual best
responses.
2.3 Equilibrium
We will look for perfect Bayesian equilibria in which an incumbent maximizes his
payoﬀ given the beliefs of the voters. (These beliefs must be consistent with Bayes
rule in equilibrium.) We solve the model backwards, beginning with the period two
policy choice. This is straightforward  compassionate policy makers protect the
vulnerable for all cost levels and sizes of shocks while selÞsh incumbents never do so.
In the period two election, the candidate of party J is parametrized by a pair
of characteristics {kJ , qJ} where kJ is the candidates ideology and qJ is the candi-
dates reputation, i.e., the probability that the candidate is compassionate. Non-
vulnerable voters are not interested in qk since they do not value social protection.
However, vulnerable voters may be prepared to vote for a candidate who is more
likely to be compassionate as an insurance device against future shocks, even if that
candidate does not share their ideology. The interesting case is where
1+β
2
f > λ  a
vulnerable citizen gets a large enough expected beneÞt from social protection relative
to ideology.5
Vulnerable voters are interested in the reputational diﬀerence between the candi-
dates of the two parties as represented by |qA − qB|. A group of vulnerable voters will
support the candidate of the party that does not share their ideological preference if
|qA − qB| > 2λ/
³
1 + β
´
f . Turning to period two voting behavior, if one party has
a large enough reputational advantage, it will be supported by all of the voters who
share its ideological preference plus the informed vulnerable voters from the other
ideological group. Uninformed vulnerable voters will always vote their ideological
preference. If |qA − qB| < 2λ/
³
1 + β
´
f , all voters vote their ideological preference.
Given the randomness in elections, this determines a probability distribution over
period two policy for any given set of candidate pairs.
Parties select candidates based on their reputations. Party members will choose
the candidate that maximizes their chances of winning. Candidates are compassionate
with probability p unless they have been incumbents and their responsiveness has been
observed. Any candidate who has not been responsive in period one is an electoral
liability and will not be selected to run again. We assume that a candidate that has
5In the language of Besley and Coate (2000), this says that social protection for the vulnerable
group is politically salient if there was contest between a known compassionate and a known selÞsh
candidate in the period two election.
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been responsive is chosen to run again.6
We now consider the period one social protection decision. Let qk (σ1k,κ) denote
the probability that a candidate of ideology k is compassionate as a function of
their period one social protection decision where σ1k = 1 denotes choosing social
protection in period one and σ1k = 0 denotes not doing so. The variable κ = 1 if
the voter is informed and κ = 0 if he is uninformed. An uninformed voter using
Bayes rule learns nothing and hence will maintain their prior. Hence qk (σ1k, 0) = p.
An informed voter who observes that the incumbent is not responsive knows that he
cannot be compassionate. Hence, qk (0, 1) = 0. An informed voter who observes an
incumbent being responsive will update according to:
qk (1, 1) =
p
p+ Pr {σ1k = 1 : S} (1− p) ,
where Pr {σ1k = 1 : S} is the probability that a selÞsh politician will protect the
vulnerable. The reputational gain from being responsive in period one is therefore
p
"
(1− p) (1− Pr {σ1k = 1 : S})
p+ Pr {σ1k = 1 : S} (1− p)
#
This is largest when Pr {σ1k = 1 : S} is small. To describe the period one policy
equilibrium, it is useful to deÞne:
Γk (θ) =
 H
³
−
³
γL − γR
´´
−H
³
−
³
γL − γR
´
− θ
´
if k = L
H
³
−
³
γL − γR
´
+ θ
´
−H
³
−
³
γL − γR
´´
if k = H
as the gain in the probability of being re-elected from attracting an extra fraction θ
of voters. It is straightforward to show that Γk (·) is an increasing function.
We use this to characterize the period one social protection decision. The model
may have multiple equilibria. There is always an equilibrium in which selÞsh incum-
bents do not protect the vulnerable and are not re-selected by their parties in period
two. However, there is also the possibility of an equilibrium where selÞsh incumbents
choose social protection, being motivated by reputational gains. An equilibrium of
this form is described in:
Proposition 1 Suppose that p
h
(1−p)(1−ρ)
p+ρ(1−p)
i
> 2λ
(1+β)f
and that a fraction β1 of the
vulnerable citizens are aﬀected by the period one shock. Then, there is an equilibrium
in which a selÞsh incumbent of type k protects the vulnerable when the cost shock is
low if and only if Γk
³
(m+ (1−m) β1) γ−kv
´
λ > β1cL.
We will refer to this as a responsive equilibrium. It describes a situation in which the
incumbent protects the vulnerable whenever the cost shock is low and the size of the
shock (β1) falls in an appropriate range.
6Clearly this is optimal if |qA − qB| > 2λ/
¡
1 + β
¢
f . Otherwise party members are indiﬀerent.
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To generate a responsive equilibrium, a selÞsh incumbent must gain suﬃcient
reputation from protecting the vulnerable. His incentive to do so hinges on two
things. First, whether social protection becomes a salient issue for the vulnerable
voters. The condition p
h
(1−p)(1−ρ)
p+ρ(1−p)
i
> 2λ
(1+β)f
guarantees that this is the case. The
second consideration is whether the expected gain from being responsive is large
enough to oﬀset the cost. The condition stated in the Proposition guarantees that
this is the case. The left hand side is the increase in the probability of a candidate
of ideology k being elected and the right hand side is the cost of acting. This
depends upon the fraction of informed vulnerable citizens of the opposite ideology
that is informed, as this is the group of voters that an incumbent can attract by
being responsive.
The Proposition reveals why the link between government responsiveness and the
size of the shock is ambiguous. There are two eﬀects. First, a larger group size
raises the group that Þnd out directly about whether the government is responsive.
This will tend to increase the rewards from being responsive and thereby enhance the
incentive to protect the vulnerable. Second, a larger aﬀected group also raises the
cost of being responsive as this is paid on a per capita basis. This will tend to reduce
the incentive to respond. However, it is still possible for government to be responsive
whether or not the media broadcast government actions in response to shocks.
Increasing access to mass media unambiguously increases the incentive to be re-
sponsive in this model as it increases the return to reputation building, i.e. increases
Γk
³
(m+ (1−m) β1) γ−kv
´
. If everyone is informed about government responsiveness
then the gain from being responsive does not depend upon the size of the shock at
all.
The nature of responsive equilibria can be seen more clearly by considering an
example where shocks to election outcomes are uniformly distributed on [−E,E].
Then, the expected gain from attracting a fraction θ more voters is:
Γk (θ) =

1 if θ > E − ωk
θ
2E
if θ ∈ [− (ωk + E) , E − ωk]
0 if θ < − (ωk + E) ,
where ωL = γ
L − γR = −ωR.
It is now straightforward to depict a responsive equilibrium in the Proposition
graphically. Note that the critical value of θ is(m+ (1−m)β1) γ−kv , i.e., the fraction
of informed vulnerable citizens. The graphs hold the fraction of citizens who have
access to the media, m, Þxed. We then plot gain from being responsive and the cost
of being responsive as functions of β. We do so for party A  the logic for party B is
basically the same. In Figure 1, λ > cL and γ
R
v > E − ωk.7 There is then a single
cut-oﬀ value of β above which the selÞsh incumbent will respond to the shock if the
draw is cL. In Figure 2, there is a eβ ∈ hβ, 1i such that λ = eβcL. In this case, there
7Both of the Þgures are drawn assuming that (m+ (1−m)β1) γRv < −ωL −E .
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are three ranges of β. For low β, the selÞsh incumbent is not responsive if the shock
is low, while the incumbent is responsive if there is a middling shock. However, a
high shock results in the government not being responsive. The last eﬀect occurs
because it is more costly for the incumbent to deal with extensive shocks. This simple
analysis illustrates why government responsiveness to shocks may be non-linear and
even non-monotonic.8
The eﬀect of increasing access to the media can be illustrated in these diagrams:
it moves the curve representing the beneÞt from responsiveness to the left. Hence,
it unambiguously increases the range in which the government responds to shocks.
However, this responsive eﬀect is likely to be non-linear with media having more of
an eﬀect in certain ranges of the size of the shock.
The theoretical model also illustrates why competitive elections are likely to en-
hance government responsiveness.9 This can be illustrated in the diagram by varying
the magnitude of ωL. If ωL is close to a zero, then the left party has no intrinsic
advantage in an election fought on ideological lines. Now consider what happens
when ωL becomes positive  it shifts the beneÞt curve to the right reducing the range
of βs for which the government is responsive. The reasoning is clear  a government
with a large advantage has less incentive to be responsive because this will not much
aﬀect the probability that it is re-elected. Parallel reasoning suggests that a govern-
ment that is behind in the election (ideologically) will have a higher incentive to be
responsive.
The model can also be used to address the link between polarization and gov-
ernment responsiveness. There are two eﬀects heading in opposite directions which
make this ambiguous a priori. The Þrst operates through voting. An increase in
ideological divergence raises 2λ
(1+β)f
, implying that the reputational diﬀerence between
the candidates has to be much larger to make social protection a politically salient
issue. This weakens the incentives for reputation building and makes it less likely
that there will be a responsive equilibrium. The second eﬀect arises from the fact
that λ aﬀects the value from holding oﬃce. This enhances the incumbents incen-
tive to build a reputation. It is interesting to note that private rents would enhance
government responsiveness by making reputation building more attractive.
Before turning to the empirical implications of the model, we complete the anal-
ysis of the remaining stages of the game. Turning now to the stage one election,
the probability that party A wins is ψ
³
γL − γR
´
and party B wins with probability³
1− ψ
³
γL − γR
´´
. Party members are indiﬀerent between all of the potential can-
8A couple of other cases are worth noting. The government is never responsive (cL is high
enough) and always responsive  if βγRv >
1
2 − ωk +E. In the latter case, there is no need to have
media to have government responsiveness. Essentially, the political weight of the group that are
aﬀected is suﬃcient for the government to respond.
9This is related to an old debate in the political science literature initiated in large part by Key
[1950] who argued that lack of political competition was on the whole detrimental to economically
disadvantaged groups.
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didates who share their ideological view. The output of the model is a probability
distribution over period one policy according to the outcome of the election in each
period, the structure of shocks and the probability that compassionate and selÞsh
incumbents are selected.
2.4 Empirical Implications
The theoretical model highlights a number of things that we should see in the data.
Government responsiveness is likely to be a function of the severity of shocks. As
shocks get bigger and aﬀect a larger group of people the electoral cost of not respond-
ing to them increases. However, there is no need for the group to become a majority
to gain political attention. The cost of not responding is also magniÞed by media
attention. The cost of responding, however, also increases with the size of shocks.
Thus, the relationship between responsiveness and the size of the aﬀected group is
not clear a priori and we can investigate this in the data.
If governments are not inherently benevolent we would expect politics to matter
for responsiveness. Greater political participation by citizens will tend to strengthen
electoral incentives for incumbents to be responsive. We will be looking at this issue
by examining how electoral turnout aﬀects responsiveness to shocks across Indian
states.10 With greater turnout the power of vulnerable citizens to swing elections
is greater and knowing this incumbent politicians are likely to be more responsive
to their need for social protection. We might also expect responsiveness is greatest
where political competition is most intense and ruling parties are least secure as
regards electoral margin. To measure this, we will look at the absolute diﬀerence
between the proportion of seats gained by the two dominant parties in a state.
Though not strictly predicted by the theory it will also be interesting to examine
whether governments are more responsive nearer election times. This would be
expected if citizens are more likely to react to more recent events when they make
their voting decisions. Finally we would want to examine how polarization within
the electorate aﬀects responsiveness. Theory on this matter is ambiguous, however,
10This can be brought formally into the model laid out above. Suppose that there are two shocks
to electoral outcomes  the shock ε laid out above which is biased in favor of the L party and a
shock σ (∈ (σ,σ) ⊂ (0, 1)) which is unbiased. Let the density of σ be k (σ). Then party L wins if
σ (ωL − ωR) + ε > 1
2
.
Suppose that H (ε) is uniform. Then if γ−kv ∈
£
1
2 − σ∗ωk −E, 12 − σ∗ωk +E
¤
for k ∈ {L,R} where
σ∗ = is expected turnout, then
Γk (θ) =
σ∗θ
2E
is the expected gain from being responsive which is increasing in turnout. Thus responsiveness is
increasing in expected turnout provided that there is enough noise in elections.
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it would be interesting to see which way it goes in the data. Where society is more
polarized along ideological lines, policy performance may have less of an impact in
terms of leading voters to switch their votes to more responsive incumbents.11 This
will tend to weaken incentives for politicians to build reputations. Higher levels
of ideological polarization, on the other hand, will tend to increase the value of
holding oﬃce. This enhances the incumbents incentive to build a reputation. We
analyze this issue in the data by looking at how caste polarization aﬀects government
responsiveness.
Our theory also suggests that responsiveness should be greater where information
ßows are more developed. Availability of mass media should permit vulnerable citi-
zens to learn about incumbents reputations. This should aﬀect their voting decisions
and strengthen incentives for politicians to respond to shocks. To look at this, we will
examine how newspaper circulation, in the aggregate and broken down by language,
aﬀects government responsiveness.
3 Institutional Context
We use data from the sixteen major Indian states for the period 19581992 to test
the implications of the theory. India is an important case study for analyzing the
political economy of responsiveness. It is home to a large vulnerable population
which is regularly buﬀeted by natural shocks including droughts, ßoods, earthquakes
and cyclones.12 Over time, measures including public food distribution, calamity
relief expenditure and public works projects have been developed to deal with these
shocks. India is a federal democracy and popularly elected Indian state governments
play a key role in social protection. Press activity in Indian states exhibits signiÞcant
time-series and cross-sectional variation.
The development of policies to deal with natural shocks in India is closely in-
tertwined with famine prevention. Though famine relief has a long history,13 Dreze
(1991) points out that the emergence of a coherent and eﬀective strategy to deal with
the threat of famine is relatively recent. For a large part of its history the state in
India had limited success in dealing with these crises, leading to the death of millions
(see Sen, 1981; Dreze 1991; Dreze and Sen, 1989). Frequent and severe famines dur-
ing both the 18th and 19th centuries were a major source of concern to the British
11The model also predicts that an incumbent should be less responsive were he not subject to
re-election incentives. While there are no term limits in India to test this with, it is interesting to
note that Besley and Case (1995) Þnd that US states where the governor faces a binding term limit
are less responsive to natural disasters  a Þnding which is consistent with the theory presented
here.
12Over the period an average of about half the population fell below the poverty line.
13A treatise ascribed to Kautilya written over two thousand years ago recommends that when
famine threatens the king should insitute the building of forts or water-works with the grant of
food, or share (his) provisions (with them), or entrust the country (to another king). (Cited by
Dreze (1991)).
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Administration which came to power in 1858. This led to the setting up of Famine
Commissions, most notably that of 1880, which produced a set of Famine Codes 
detailed guidelines for local administrators about the anticipation, recognition and
relief of famines.14 The 1880 Report represented a turning point in the history of
calamity relief in India. For the Þrst time there was an eﬀective nationwide strategy
for dealing with the threat of famines and other natural calamities. As Dreze (1991)
points out such was the success of this strategy that the history of famine prevention
in India may be divided into the a pre-1880 period characterized by frequent and
severe famines and a post-1880 period where there were few famines.15
Famines, however did still occur during the post 1880 British period most notably
during 1896-1897, 1899-1900 and 1943. Analysis of these famines suggest that relief
guidelines were, on occasion, ignored.16 The existence of these guidelines clearly did
not guarantee their early and energetic implementation. This points to a need to have
mechanisms in place for triggering relief measures.17 Politics and the media can play
a role here. Following Independence in 1947, the arrival of representative democracy
and the rise of mass media helped to strengthen accountability within the calamity re-
lief system. India became a federal democracy and elected state governments assumed
responsibility for calamity relief. Elections to state legislative assemblies therefore be-
came a mechanism through which politicians could be held accountable for responding
to droughts or ßoods occurring within their jurisdictions. India also witnessed an ex-
plosion in newspaper circulation during this period with much of this growth being
accounted for by regional papers published in languages other than English or Hindi
(see Jeﬀrey, 2000). The newspaper industry that developed was distinguished from
the bulk of other low income countries by being relatively free and independent.18 The
press in India has been ascribed a major role in monitoring the actions of politicians
and in ensuring their responsiveness to droughts and ßoods which occur at frequent
intervals. Ram (1991: 186) describes its role in averting crisis: Over time, it has
tended to bring out the facts in the Þeld with elements of vivid descriptive and human
interest detail; and to expose the failure of government authorities to recognize the
problem, its causes and early symptoms, and to respond quickly and adequately in
14The Famine Codes emphasized the need for local administrators to look for signs, such as large
drops in food production and increases in food prices, which signal an impending crisis and then
to respond quickly through the setting up of massive public works and relief centres to prevent the
onset of famine. The Famine Codes still constitute the backbone of calamity relief policy in India
today.
15The development and extension of communication (particularly railways) also enhanced the
capability of the British to deal with the threat of famine (see Dreze, 1991).
16For example during the Bengal Famine of 1943 where between 1.5 and 4 million people lost their
lives (see Sen 1981).
17The seminal analysis of the Bengal Famine of 1943 by Sen (1981) pointed to how political factors
led to the Famine Codes being deliberately ignored.
18Note that this is in strict contrast to TV and radio which were mainly under state control hands
during the 1958-1992 period. In contrast only 2% of newspapers in India are owned by central and
state governments.
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terms of crisis prevention, management, and relief.19 Massive expansion in the pub-
lic distribution system which has involved large-scale government involvement in the
procurement, storage, transportation and distribution of food grains also enhanced
the governments ability to respond to shocks. Though this system has been inade-
quate to the challenge of reducing mass-poverty in India its role in preventing famines
is well recognized (see Dreze, 199; Alhuwalia, 1993).
Table 1 provides means and standard deviations of the main variables used in the
paper.20 These are averaged for the 1958-1992 period and arrayed by state. Table 1
demonstrates there is signiÞcant variation across the Indian states in terms of gov-
ernment responses, severity of shocks, political outcomes and newspaper circulation.
In the Þrst and second columns of Table 1 we consider two dimensions of government
responses to natural shocks. The total amount of food grains per capita distributed
via the public distribution system in each state is our drought response variable.
The share of calamity relief expenditure in net state domestic income is our ßood
response variable. Public distribution of food per capita varies seven fold between
Madhya Pradesh (low) and Kerala (high). Calamity relief expenditure never consti-
tutes much more than half a percentage point of total state GDP but nonetheless
exhibits pronounced variation ranging from 0.58 % in Orissa, which is particularly
prone to natural disasters, to 0.16 % in Tamil Nadu. The shocks that we consider are
food grain production per capita as an indicator of the severity of a drought shock
and the real value of crop damage caused by ßoods as an indicator of the severity
of a ßood shock. The third and fourth columns of Table 1 indicate that there is
pronounced variation both in food grain production per capita and in the value of
crop damage from ßoods. To better capture the notion of shocks in the data we have
also graphed out these variables as deviations from (state speciÞc) means for each of
the states. These results are shown in Figures 3 and 4 and make it clear that certain
states are drought prone in terms of experiencing large ßuctuations in food grain pro-
ductions per capita whereas others are ßood prone in terms of regularly experiencing
signiÞcant ßood related crop damage.
As is apparent from Table 1 there is also pronounced variation across states in
terms of the functioning of state level political systems. Electoral turnout in elections
to state level assemblies (Vidhan Sabha) over the period is high (60.9%) indicating
that the Indian population has been politically active as a whole. There is, however,
considerable variation across states. Orissa for example registered a turnout of 44.9%
over the period whereas the corresponding Þgure for Kerala was 77.6%. Political
competition has been intense over the period. Congress has been the dominant party
over the period though in each and every state there has been numerous switches
19The lack of democracy and of freedom of information have been pointed to as reasons behind
why China experienced a major famine between 1958 and 1961 with excess mortality Þgures ranging
between 16.5 and 29.5 million whereas India has not experienced a major famine in the post-
Independence era (see Dreze and Sen, 1989).
20Detail on the construction and sources of these variables are contained in a Data Appendix.
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between Congress and various competitors (see Data Appendix). Over the period
the absolute diﬀerence between proportion of seats occupied by Congress and its
main competitor(s) has been smallest for Kerala (0.15) indicating the most intense
political competition and largest for Maharashtra (0.67) denoting the least political
competition. As regards polarization, scheduled caste and scheduled tribe (SC/ST)
individuals comprise about 22.1% of the Indian population over the period, states
however vary in terms of the concentration of these individuals ranging from 8.1% in
Jammu and Kashmir to 38.5% in Orissa. Variation along these diﬀerent dimensions
will be exploited to examine how politics aﬀects government responsiveness.
Our key proxy of media development is newspaper circulation both in aggregate
and broken down by language of circulation. While crude, we believe that it is likely
to capture well the ßow of information about policy to citizens. A key observation
is that the Indian press, unlike many others in the developing world is both free
and active.21 The freedom of the Indian press is central to its ability to elicit
timely and eﬀective government responses following natural shocks such as droughts
and ßoods (see Ram, 1991).22 Press freedom can be contrasted with other forms of
media in India, such as radio and television, which for the bulk of the period 1958
to 1992 have been under strict government control. Ram (1991: 189) notes that
the pluralism and independence of the press is in strict contrast to the regressive
monotony of the and the narrowly construed propagandistic tone of state-owned and
state-regimented television and radio. Figure 5 makes clear that the level of media
penetration varies markedly across space and time. This variation will be exploited
in our econometric analysis. Figure 5 shows that circulation in Kerala is both highest
and has grown most quickly across the period. Circulation levels are also relatively
higher in progressive states such as Tamil Nadu, Maharashtra, Karnataka, Punjab
and West Bengal whereas they are low in backwards in states such as Bihar, Uttar
Pradesh, Orissa, Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan giving the impression that media
development is linked to social development. However, the correlation with state
income is not particularly strong. Less surprisingly, it is closely related to literacy.23
Jeﬀrey (2000) notes that much of the growth of newspaper circulation is accounted
21 Ram (1991: 188) underlines this point by stating that the Indian press is widely regarded
as the most pluralistic, the least inhibited and the most assertive or independent in all the Third
World.
22One way to look at the issue of plurality and independence of the Indian press is to look
at ownership structure. Over the period 1958-1992 only a very small fraction (roughly 2%) of
newspaper titles are owned directly by central or state government. Ownership of the remainder is
spread across a variety of owners who are quasi-independent from the state with the bulk of titles
(roughly 70%) being owned by private individuals (Press in India, Annual Report of the Registrar
of Newspapers for India, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India).With an
ownership structure as independent and plural as this it is perhaps not surprising that the press in
India plays a central role in highlighting government failure to respond to crisis situations.
23The correlation coeﬃcient between net state domestic income per capita and newspaper circula-
tion per capita is 0.27 compared to a correlation coeﬃcient between the literacy rate and newspaper
circulation of 0.81.
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for by the rise of regional papers published in languages other than English in Hindi.
From Table 1 it is clear that for the bulk of state newspaper circulation is now
accounted for by these newspapers which may have a stronger focus on local issues
than the nationals.24
4 Empirical Analysis
4.1 Method
Our basic method is to run panel data regressions for states i and years t of the
following form:
git = αi + βt + δsit + γ(sit)(zit) + φzit + uit (1)
where αi and βt are state and year Þxed eﬀects and zit is a vector of economic, political
and media variables which we might expect to aﬀect government responsiveness (git).
This speciÞcation allows the right hand side variables zit to enter both with level
eﬀects aﬀecting the permanent level of government responsiveness and as interaction
terms with the shock. Hence, we can estimate both average and marginal responses
to shocks.
We begin by investigating how measures of shocks (sit) aﬀect diﬀerent dimensions
of government responsiveness (git). We will isolate two shock-response systems for
further analysis. We then include some economic controls as elements of zit, such
as state domestic income, level of urbanization and population density which might
capture the technological capacity of state governments to respond.
We then extend the zit vector to include media and political variables. These
include newspaper circulation, electoral turnout, political competitiveness, caste po-
larization and timing of elections. Taking the economic, political and media variables
together will allow us to build up a picture of what factors drive states to be more
active in areas such as food distribution and calamity relief while controlling for the
impact of shocks. Drawing from the theory, the coeﬃcients on the media and political
variables are of particular interest as we would not expect them to have any impact
for purely benevolent governments.
Having examined these level or average eﬀects we then turn to analyze the marginal
eﬀects of political and media variables (zit) on responsiveness by interacting them with
shock variables (sit). Coeﬃcients on the interaction terms (sit)(zit) tell us, for a given
shock, whether having higher newspaper circulation, greater political participation or
competition, higher caste polarization or proximate elections enhances or depresses
responsiveness. This analysis which is motivated by the theory hinting at the pos-
sibility of non-linear responses allows us to trace out how state governments have
24Other includes newspapers published in Assamese, Bengali, Gujarati, Kannada, Kashmiri,
Konkani, Malayalam, Marathi, Manipuri, Nepali, Oriya, Punjabi, Sanskrit, Sindhi, Tamil, Telugu
and Urdu. Typically only one of these languages is prevalent in a given state.
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responded to speciÞc shock episodes either by distributing food or via the provision
of calamity relief.
Droughts and ßoods occur at regular intervals in Indian states during the 1958-
1992 period. As these natural shocks are relatively exogenous events, depending
mainly on the vagaries of climate, our marginal analysis which focuses on interpre-
tation of coeﬃcients on (sit)(zit), makes us more conÞdent that we are capturing the
impact of political and media variables on responsiveness as opposed to the eﬀect of
correlated variables omitted from the regression. The Þnal empirical eﬀorts inves-
tigate media and responsiveness in greater detail, worrying about possible reasons
why newspaper circulation could be correlated with the error in the responsiveness
equation.
4.2 Results
4.2.1 The Shock-Response Relationship
We consider two social protection measures collected from independent sources: per
capita public food distribution and calamity relief expenditure expressed as a share
of net state domestic income. Our measures of shocks are food grain production
and the real value of crops damaged by ßoods. We begin in Table 2 by showing
that these shocks do invoke public responses. Column (1) indicates that public
food distribution responds to drops in food grain production but not to crop damage
caused by ßoods, suggesting that this is mainly a response to droughts. Column (4)
indicates that calamity relief expenditure responds to crop damage but not to drops
in food grain production indicating that it is mainly a response to ßoods. This,
therefore, gives us two distinct shock-response systems to explore further in the data:
food productionfood distribution linkages and ßood damagecalamity relief linkages.
We present separate panels for each of these and compare the results.
Columns (2) and (5) examine the structure of responsiveness in more detail. We
construct dummy variables for whether an observation for a particular state and year
is in the 0-25, 25-50, 50-75 or 75-100 percentile of the state speciÞc distribution of food
production or crop damage. Column (2) suggests that the impact of food production
on public food distribution is non-linear being signiÞcant for observations below the
state median and insigniÞcant above. Equality of coeﬃcients is clearly rejected by
the F test shown at the bottom of column (2). Henceforth, therefore, we will use
a food shock indicator variable which is equal to one to one if food production in
that year is below the states sample median, and is zero otherwise. The result in
column (3) implies that having a food shock measured in this way leads to a 20%
increase in food distributed through the public distribution system.
Column (5) shows that the impact of ßood crop damage on calamity relief ex-
penditure is linear with all parts of the distribution having a similar and signiÞcant
impact on policy. The F test conÞrms that we cannot reject the equality of the
coeﬃcients. Henceforth, therefore, we will use the level of ßood crop damage as our
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measure of the shock. The coeﬃcient in column (6) implies that a 1% increase in
the real value of crop damage caused by a ßood leads to a 23% increase in calamity
relief expenditure.
4.2.2 Basic Results
Table 3 presents our baseline results on the determinants of responsiveness in Indian
states. In addition to including our shock indicators, columns (1) and (3) introduce
income per capita, urbanization and population density as proxies for the capacity of
governments to respond. For example, we would expect richer states to have more
developed response mechanisms. Population density and urbanization should also
reßect the ease of reaching target populations.
We Þnd no impact of state income on public food distribution and the fraction of
state income devoted to calamity relief tends to decline with state income.25 Popu-
lation density is insigniÞcant in both regressions and urbanization is insigniÞcant in
the calamity relief regression. Column (1) suggests that more urbanized states have
higher levels of public food distribution. This eﬀect, however, disappears when we
control for media and political variables in column (2). Economic factors appear to
have a limited impact on government responsiveness. Richer, more urbanized or more
densely populated states do not appear to be more responsive. This suggests that the
technological capacity to respond may not be the key determinant of responsiveness.
And this leads us to examine a range of factors, ranging from mass media to politics,
which may aﬀect incentives for government to be responsive to the social protection
needs of citizens.
Columns (2) and (4) add newspaper circulation and political factors to explain
the average level of responsiveness. They show that, after controlling for both shock
levels and basic economic and political indicators, newspaper circulation is positively
and signiÞcantly correlated with both food distribution and calamity relief. Thus,
those states that have higher levels of media development are also more responsive
(on average) in terms of public food distribution and calamity relief expenditure. A
1% increase in newspaper circulation is associated with a 2.4% increase in public
food distribution and a 5.5% increase in the share of public expenditures devoted to
calamity relief. These are large and signiÞcant eﬀects. Overall, this is consistent with
our theory in which development of mass media may improve information dissemina-
tion and make a government more responsive in protecting the vulnerable.
Columns (2) and (4) also include a range of political factors that might be cor-
related with responsiveness. Electoral turnout is a reasonable proxy for political
activism and hence might enhance electoral incentives to protect vulnerable citizens.
The level of political competitiveness proxied by the electoral margin between the
ruling party and its main competitor might also be expected to aﬀect incentives to
respond. The fraction of the population classiÞed as scheduled caste/scheduled tribe
25This may be due to poorer states being more prone to natural disasters.
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is a rough measure of polarization in Indian society.26 We also include an election
dummy, equal to one if it is an election or pre-election year in a given state. While,
not strictly predicted by the theory, it is possible that governments are more respon-
sive near elections if citizens have better memories about recent events.
The results show that, controlling for shocks, electoral turnout rates in Indian
states do not exert a direct eﬀect on either levels of public food distribution or
calamity relief expenditures. Where ruling parties are more secure due to there
being larger electoral margins and less political competition we tend to see higher
levels public food distribution. This is not the case for calamity relief. We also
observe that state governments are more responsive in terms of public food distri-
bution during election and pre-election years. (The coeﬃcient corresponds to a 15%
increase in public food distribution in election and pre-election years.) This eﬀect
is not present for calamity relief expenditures. Having a higher fraction of scheduled
caste/scheduled tribe in the population does not appear to aﬀect average levels of
food distribution or calamity relief. The results suggest that, in particular for public
food distribution, politics matter. Governments who are threatened either due to
there being a close competitor or due to the proximity of an election tend to be more
responsive.27 In both columns (2) and (4) we Þnd that both the shock and newspa-
per circulation variables are positive and signiÞcant and are robust to the inclusion
of both political and economic controls.
These baseline results support the notion that both politics and media develop-
ment are correlated with government responsiveness. Moreover, parallel Þndings
emerge from studying the eﬀects of food production shocks on public food distribu-
tion (columns (1) - (2)) and the eﬀect of crop damage on calamity relief expenditure
(columns (3) - (4)). This is true even though these data were collected from entirely
independent sources (see the Data Appendix). The eﬀect of economic variables are
less pronounced. Only state per capita income exerts a negative inßuence on calamity
relief. All other coeﬃcients on the economic control variables are insigniÞcant. This
suggests that the capacity to respond may be less important than there being media
and political channels in place through which citizens can inßuence the actions of
politicians in order to ensure that their preferences are reßected in policy.
In summary, we Þnd that, across the board, higher newspaper circulation lev-
els are associated with higher average responsiveness. Election cycles and political
competitiveness have a strong impact on public food distribution whereas electoral
turnout and polarization do not appear to aﬀect responsiveness when introduced as
26The Hindu caste system assigns every individual to a caste and each caste occupies a determinate
position in a hierarchical scale of ranks. Between two to three thousand castes exist, of which 779 of
the most socially disadvantaged castes are identiÞed by the Government of India as scheduled castes.
Scheduled tribe refers to members of Indias indigenous tribal population. In the 1991 census about
25% of population is identiÞed as scheduled caste or scheduled tribe of which about two thirds is
made up of scheduled caste (Pande, 1999).
27This idea is consistent with the empirical evidence from the U.S. by Holbrook and van Dunk
[1993].
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a level. Overall, it seems reasonable to account for these results with a model that
emphasizes the importance of government incentives.
4.2.3 Political Determinants of Marginal Responsiveness
So far, we have only considered average eﬀects. However, the theory suggests the
possibility that political eﬀects can also change marginal responsiveness to a shock.
We examine this by interacting our political and media variables with shock variables
for both kinds of government responsiveness as well as including the level eﬀects.
In presenting these interactions, the food shock variable that we use is the annual
deviation of food grain production per capita from the state speciÞc median value for
the period 1958-1992.28
These results are displayed in Table 4. In columns (1) and (4) we see that, while
lagged turnout has no impact on average responsiveness, it does have an impact on
marginal responsiveness for both kinds of public action. As food production falls
below its state speciÞc median or as the value of crop damage caused by ßooding
increases, having higher turnout in the previous election tends to increase the re-
sponsiveness of governments to these shocks. This is consistent with the idea that
electoral threats will tend to be greater where states have a greater tradition of turn-
ing out to vote.
In columns (2) we see that where political competition is less intense as measured
by there being a larger gap between the number of seats occupied by the ruling party
and its main competitors then governments tend to be less responsive to the poor in
terms of public food distribution. We Þnd no comparable eﬀect for calamity relief in
column (6). Coeﬃcients on terms where political competitiveness is interacted with
shock variables are both insigniÞcant. Thus while greater political competition seems
to enhance average responsiveness as regards food distribution it does not appear
to make state governments in India more responsive to speciÞc drought and ßood
shocks.
Columns (3) and (7) examine level and interaction terms for caste polarization
eﬀects. Level eﬀects remain negative and insigniÞcant for both food distribution and
calamity relief suggesting that polarization does not aﬀect how active states are, on
average, in these areas of social protection. In column (5) the interaction term is neg-
ative and signiÞcant signalling that greater fragmentation along caste or tribal lines
tends to depress the responsiveness of state governments to ßood shocks.29 This re-
28Using the food shock dummy often resulted in including a variable that was highly collinear
with the political variables and, while delivering similar Þndings, could not be considered reliable.
Interactions generated using the deviations from the median measure are not problematic in this
sense. However, collinearity concerns do make it unreliable to include multiple interaction terms in
the same regression. Hence, we only investigate these ad serium.
29This may be because in more polarised states citizens vote more on ideological grounds as
opposed to on the observed actions of incumbents thereby weakening incentives for politicians to
build reputations for being responsive. This is consistent with evidence that voting in India has
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sult resonates with a growing literature which suggests that polarization along ethnic
or income dimensions tends to weaken collective action and lower economic perfor-
mance.30. The interaction term in column (3), however, goes in the opposite direction
suggesting that states with greater caste polarization tend to be more responsive to
speciÞc food production shocks. This may reßect the success of low caste groups in
galvanizing political support to increase ßows of food grains through the public food
distribution system during periods of drought. Like the predictions emerging from
the theory these results are ambiguous. They are, nonetheless, interesting as they
suggest that the degree of polarization in a state does aﬀect marginal responsiveness.
Table 4 also introduces an interaction term for the election and pre-election year
eﬀects. We see that these variables interacted with our shock variables have no
inßuence on responsiveness. Being in an election or pre-election year does not seem
to make politicians more responsive on the margin to shocks. In column (3) we see
that being in an election or pre-election year, however, does continue to increase
the amount of food distributed per capita on average suggesting that this may be a
populist measure.
Taken together we Þnd that political eﬀects are more pronounced for the food
distribution than for calamity relief. This is understandable given that public food
distribution system is a larger, more politicized operation. Ration shops which op-
erate during both shock and non-shock periods are viewed as key source of social
protection for the poor and vulnerable against both chronic and transitory food inse-
curity and are a subject of intense political debate and scrutiny. In contrast, calamity
relief operations by being both limited to shock periods and beneÞting a smaller frac-
tion of the electorate are likely to attract relatively less political attention.
Inclusion of the various interaction terms does not lead to signiÞcant changes in
the other included regressors. In particular, the coeﬃcient on newspaper circulation
per capita remains robustly positive and signiÞcant.
4.2.4 Media and Responsiveness
In this section, we will explore the relationship between newspaper circulation and
government responsiveness in greater detail. Columns (1) and (4) of Table 5 allow
our proxy for media development to have both a marginal and an average eﬀect,
the latter being estimated by interacting newspaper circulation with shocks. As
in Tables 3 and 4 the average eﬀect of newspaper circulation remains positive and
signiÞcant. The coeﬃcients on the interaction terms are also positive and signiÞcant
for both systems, suggesting that the response to a shock is greater on the margin
when newspaper circulation is higher. Where the actions of politicians are more
traditionally been done along caste (high caste, SC/ST), party (Congress, non-Congress) or family
(Ghandhi, non-Ghandhi) lines. In this situation there will be less swing voters and the incentive for
a candidate to build a reputation by responding to crises is weakened.
30See, for example, Alesina, Baqir and Easterly [1999], Miguel, [1999], la Ferrara, [1999] and
Narayan and Pritchett [1998].
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transparent due to the actions of the press we tend to see them being more active in
terms of implementing policies which accord some degree of protection to vulnerable
citizens against shocks. The results are striking as we see the same pattern for both
average and marginal eﬀects across two separate shock-response systems based on
diﬀerent data sources.
To give some idea of the magnitudes involved we Þnd that a 10 % drop in food
production is associated with a 1 % increase in public food distribution in states
which are at the median in terms of newspaper circulation per capita. However, for
states that are in the 75 % percentile in terms of newspaper circulation per capita
we Þnd that a 10 % drop in food production is associated with a 2.28 % increase in
public food distribution. These are economically meaningful responses.
These marginal results are in line with our theory. The fact that we include an
array of other controls makes it more likely that this is indeed a media eﬀect rather
than a proxy for some other omitted variable. However, the possibility that there
is some third factor driving responsiveness and newspaper circulation is a reasonable
concern and the remainder of this section explores this issue further by exploring the
robustness of our media eﬀects to a number of further tests.
We begin by looking at newspaper circulation disaggregated by language. India
is a linguistically diverse country and the large array of languages in which newspa-
pers are published is symptomatic of this. In addition to the national languages
English and Hindi we have information on the circulation of newspapers published
in Assamese, Bengali, Gujarati, Kannada, Kashmiri, Konkani, Malayalam, Marathi,
Manipuri, Nepali, Oriya, Punjabi, Sanskrit, Sindhi, Tamil, Telugu and Urdu. Most of
these languages are speciÞc to a particular state. It is quite possible that newspapers
published in local languages are more eﬀective in informing potential voters and elic-
iting government responsiveness. This might be the case if the poor and vulnerable
are able to read newspapers in local languages but not in either Hindi or English.
Newspapers published in local languages might also focus more on local, state speciÞc
crises relative to national papers which have to satisfy a wider readership. It is, how-
ever, diﬃcult to think of reasons why language of publication should be correlated
to some omitted variable which might be driving the aggregated results shown in
columns (1) and (4). We, therefore, supplemented our data set with information on
newspaper circulation by language. This enables us to see whether the publication
language aﬀects government responsiveness. For the nineteen languages on which we
have circulation data on English and Hindi are national in scope whereas the other
seventeen tend to be speciÞc to particular states. We have therefore aggregated this
information into three groups; English, Hindi and other which captures a range of
regional papers published in seventeen local languages. This categorization allows
us to investigate whether regional, local language presses are more eﬀective than
national presses in creating incentives for state level politicians to respond to local
livelihood crises.
It also mitigates concerns that our media results are being driven by some omitted
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social development variable. Patterns of the evolution of newspaper readership vary
considerably by state so the source of identiÞcation of the media eﬀect is potentially
rather diﬀerent when we use the language speciÞc data. For example, the state of
Kerala that has experienced a rapid increase in newspaper circulation has mainly
done so by increasing circulation of titles in local languages. Overall, circulation of
English newspapers has not increased over the period while Hindi newspapers have
increased their circulation by 5.8% per annum. However, this varies from a 24%
annual growth rate in Assam to a 17% annual reduction in Karnataka. Overall,
non-English, non-Hindi newspaper circulation grows at 1.7% with a 7% growth rate
in Bihar and small declines in three states.
To examine the hypothesis that language of publication might aﬀect responsive-
ness we allowed three categories of newspaper circulation to enter separately in our
basic regression. The results are given in Table 5. In columns (2) and (4) we Þnd
that, controlling for shocks and our economic and political controls, we Þnd that it is
the regional local language press, captured under other newspaper circulation, that
is driving our results. Neither English or Hindi circulation are associated with higher
levels of food distribution or calamity relief at the state level. When we introduce
our three categories of newspaper circulation interacted with the shock variables we
get the same pattern of results (see columns (3) and (6)). It is other newspaper
circulation entered on it own or interacted with the shock which drives up respon-
siveness. This congruence of average and marginal eﬀects suggest a focus on the role
of regional presses which disseminate information in local languages that drive both
average levels of responsiveness as well as responsiveness to speciÞc drought and ßood
shocks.
These Þndings make sense as we are studying responses by state governments
where the role of a more localized press is likely to be more important than the
national press. In many ways the story of the press media in India in the post-
Independence era is one about newspapers being increasingly published in the state-
speciÞc local languages spoken by the bulk of Indians (Jeﬀrey, 2000). The fact that
local language papers are both read by the poor and vulnerable and have a highly
localized focus helps to explain why it is these newspapers that are driving our results
and not the newspapers published in either English or Hindi. It is these regional
presses which appear to lie at the heart of why media development encourages
government responsiveness in Indian states.
These results are also much less likely to be driven by a monolithic omitted so-
cial development variable which is correlated with government responsiveness and
newspaper circulation. It is diﬃcult to identify omitted variables (demand, social
development, education) that would be correlated with other circulation but not
with English or Hindi circulation. The fact that we observe symmetric average and
marginal media eﬀects for two distinct shock response is also encouraging.
Our Þnal eﬀort is to confront head on the possibility that newspaper circulation
may be endogenous or correlated with some other omitted variable that is trending
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over time in diﬀerent states in a way that is correlated with government responsive-
ness. To deal with this convincingly would require an appropriate instrument for
newspaper circulation. This is not very straightforward. However, as a robustness
check on the importance of the media, we venture the possibility that sex speciÞc lit-
eracy rates which reßect stocks of human capital in male and female populations may
aﬀect newspaper circulation without having an independent eﬀect on responsiveness.
Adult literacy and in particular female adult literacy is closely correlated with
newspaper circulation but does not directly inßuence government responsiveness in
the areas of food distribution and calamity relief when we include it as a regressor.
When we disaggregated newspaper circulation by language we found that literacy
exerts a disproportionately strong inßuence on the distribution of newspapers not
published in English or Hindi. This reßects the impact of literacy extending beyond
elites and beginning to reach poorer segments of the Indian population thus creating
demand for local language newspapers (see Jeﬀrey, 2000). We therefore have a story
about investments in education aﬀecting female and male adult literacy in diﬀerent
states which in turn drive the growth of newspapers and in particular the growth of
regional newspapers.
Our Þnding of a positive and signiÞcant relationship between literacy and newspa-
per circulation is not surprising given that literacy embodies educational achievement
and will aﬀect both demand for newspapers and the ability of citizens to absorb infor-
mation. Moreover, it may aﬀect political development, for example by aﬀecting the
use of leaßet drops in electoral campaigns. Here, we experiment with the possibility
that it drives newspaper circulation, without having a direct eﬀect on responsiveness
and therefore can be used as an instrument to check the robustness of our Þndings.
Moreover, by using both male and female adult literacy, we are over-identiÞed and
can test whether our instruments belong in the second stage.
Table 6 presents results where male and female adult literacy rates have been used
to instrument both total (columns (1) and (3)) and other (columns (2) and (4))
newspaper circulation. The F tests for the Þrst stage shown at the base of Table 6
conÞrm that there is a signiÞcant relationship between literacy and newspaper cir-
culation and that this relationship is considerably stronger for other newspapers
relative to total newspapers. With the exception of column (1) where our instru-
ments do not pass the overidentiÞcation tests we Þnd that instrumented newspaper
circulation is positive and signiÞcant with instrumented other newspapers having
a stronger impact on public food distribution and calamity relief than instrumented
total newspaper circulation. These results are consistent with our uninstrumented
results. In columns (2), (3) and (4) our instruments do pass standard overidentiÞ-
cation tests and so pass muster on econometric grounds. The results presented in
Table 6 therefore increase our conÞdence that newspaper circulation does make state
governments in India more responsive to the concerns of poor and vulnerable citizens.
The results are also consistent in suggesting that it is other newspapers published
in local languages which are driving the results.
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Taken together, the results in Tables 3, 4, 5, and 6 are consistent with the idea
that a range of political factors and development of press media do aﬀect whether
the concerns of poor and vulnerable citizens are reßected in social protection policy.
Moreover, the pattern of results is similar across the two shock-response systems that
we have studied and we observe both average and marginal eﬀects. In contrast,
economic factors which reßect the capacity of state governments to respond such as
state income, urbanization and population density are only weakly associated with
government responsiveness. Overall, the results are supportive of the notion that
the development of political and social institutions is a prerequisite for responsive
government.
5 Concluding Comments
An eﬀectively functioning democracy has many facets. Among them is the possibility
of creating incentives for elected oﬃcials to respond to citizens needs. In this paper
we have argued that political institutions as well as economic development aﬀect
government responsiveness. Elections provide an incentive for politicians to perform
which can be enhanced by development of the media. Through this mechanism
we would expect responsiveness of the government to salient issues such as crisis
management to be greater where the media is more developed.
This allows us to revisit a literature which examines the importance of the media
in famine relief policy (see Ram, 1991). Perhaps the most famous pronouncement on
this subject was in Amartya Sens 1981 Coromandel lecture published as Sen (1984).
He observes that:
India has not had a famine since independence, and given the nature of
Indian politics and society, it is not likely that India can have a famine
even in years of great food problems. The government cannot aﬀord to fail
to take prompt action when large-scale starvation threatens. Newspapers
play an important part in this, in making the facts known and forcing the
challenge to be faced. page 84.
This view has now become received wisdom and is rarely questioned.31
Our results are consistent with this assessment. However, they highlight how
a number of other factors, including turnout, political competitiveness, polarization
and the timing of elections aﬀect how governments respond. In addition, the results
highlight the importance of local language newspapers in transmitting information.
Therefore it would appear that the introduction of representative democracy and the
development of a free and independent regional presses were key events in terms of
ensuring some protection for vulnerable citizens.32
31See Bhagwati [1995] for a dissenting voice.
32On the newspaper revolution and the rise of local language newpapers in the post-Indpendence
era see Jeﬀrey (2000).
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There is scope for further work that tries to link government policy to media de-
velopment, especially in developing countries. In an Indian context, there may be
other policies that respond to media development. More broadly, our results also
underline the potential importance of the development of civil society, of which the
media is a key branch, to an eﬀectively functioning democracy. The formal insti-
tutions of political competition (such as open elections) are not suﬃcient to deliver
a responsive government unless voters have the real authority to discipline poorly
functioning incumbents. This requires voters to have the necessary information.
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6 Appendix: Proof of Proposition 1
First, we show that the proposed pattern of responsiveness is optimal for the in-
cumbent. Consider the case of a type L incumbent  the analysis for a type R is
symmetric. If the cost shock is cL, and being responsive results in support from an
extra (m+ (1−m)β1) γRv voters then he will respond if and only if
h
1−H
³
− (γL − γH)− (m+ (1−m) β1) γRv
´i
φLL +
H
³
− (γL − γH)− (m+ (1−m) β1) γRv
´
φLR − β1cL
>
[1−H (− (γL − γH))]φLL +H (− (γL − γH))φRL
which reduces to
ΓL
³
(m+ (1−m) β1) γRv
´
λ > β1cL
recalling that λ = φLL − φLR. It is clear that the incumbent will not respond when
the cost shock is cH since ΓL
³
(m+ (1−m)β1) γRv
´
λ < λ < β1cL for all β ∈
h
β, 1
i
.
We now show that the incumbents is consistent with the assumed voting behavior
which depends upon voters updating. A citizen who observes that an incumbent has
been responsive will update the probability that he is good to
p
p+ ρ (1− p) .
Hence, we will support this incumbent against following his ideological preference
if p
h
(1−p)(1−ρ)
p+ρ(1−p)
i
> 2λ
(1+β)f
which is assumption 1. To see that the condition is also
necessary, observe that if ΓL
³
(m+ (1−m) β1) γRv
´
λ < β1cL then the incumbent
will prefer not to be responsive even if the cost shock is cL.
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7 Data Appendix
The data used in the paper come from a wide variety of sources.33 They cover the
sixteen main Indian states listed in Table 1 and span the period 1958-1992. Haryana
split from the state of Punjab in 1965. From this date on, we include separate
observations for Punjab and Haryana.
Shocks: Our measure of food shortage (total food grain production measured in
tonnes) comes from the Bulletin on Food Statistics, Ministry of Food and Agriculture,
Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of India. To capture the non-
linear relationship between food production and public food distribution we transform
this measure into a food shock indicator variable which is equal to one to one if food
production in that year is below the states sample median, and is zero otherwise.
To deal with problems of collinearity, the food shock variable that we interact with
media and political variables is the annual deviation of food grain production per
capita from the state speciÞc median value for the period 1958-1992. Our measure
of ßood shocks (real per capita value of crops aﬀected by ßoods measured in rupees)
comes from the Central Water Commission, Government of India and is available on
an annual basis.
Government Responses: Public distribution of food grains measured in tonnes
and expressed in per capita terms is our measure of how state governments respond
to food shortages caused by droughts and other natural shocks. This data comes form
the Bulletin on Food Statistics, Ministry of Food and Agriculture, Directorate of Eco-
nomics and Statistics, Government of India. Calamity relief expenditure expressed
as a share of net state domestic income is our measure of how state governments
respond to ßood shocks. This data which forms part of the social expenditure series
in state expenditure accounts is published on an annual basis in the Reserve Bank of
India Bulletin, Reserve Bank of India, Bombay, India.
Political Variables: Data on electoral turnout in state elections, which take place
on average every four years, comes from Butler, Lahiri and Roy (1991) India Decides :
Elections 1952-1991. (New Delhi : Aroom Purie for Living Media, India). Using the
same data source, we construct a measure of political competitiveness by taking the
absolute diﬀerence between the proportion of seats occupied by the Congress party
(which has the been the dominant party over the period) and the proportion occupied
by its main competitor(s). An Appendix Table provides a picture of the nature and
timing of political competition in the sixteen main Indian states. As can seen from
the table Congress, which has been the dominant political force in India, has been in
competition with a number of other political groupings over the period. The main
33Our analysis has been aided by Ozler, Datt and Ravallion [1996] which collects published data
on poverty, output, wages, price indices and population to construct a consistent panel data set on
Indian states for the period 1958 to 1992. We are grateful to Martin Ravallion for providing us with
this data. To these data, we have added information on newspapers, political representation and
public policies pursued by states.
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political threat over the period has come from the Janata grouping of parties. In six
states, Andra Pradesh, Assam, Jammu & Kashmir, Orissa, Punjab and Tamil Nadu,
Congress has also been competing with state-speciÞc Regional parties. In three states,
Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh, Congress has in competition with
the Bharatiya Janata Party which has a non-secular Hindu orientation and has been
growing in importance over time. In two states, Kerala and West Bengal, Congress
has been competing for political power over the period with Hard Left parties.34 We
also investigate how the timing of elections inßuences responsiveness by constructing
an election dummy, equal to one if it is an election or pre-election year in a given state.
Finally, the fraction of the population classiÞed as scheduled caste or scheduled tribe
is our measure of caste polarization (see Pande, 1999). This information comes from
the 1951, 1961, 1971, 1981 and 1991 censuses (Census of India, Registrar General
and Census Commissioner, Government of India) and has been interpolated between
census years.
Media Variables:Our main media penetration variable is the average number of
copies of newspapers/periodicals sold or distributed free per publishing day and comes
from Press in India, Annual Report of the Registrar of Newspapers for India, Min-
istry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India. This information is also
available from the same source broken down by language and we have constructed
three groupings: English, Hindi and other which includes newspapers/periodicals
published in Assamese, Bengali, Gujarati, Kannada, Kashmiri, Konkani, Malayalam,
Marathi, Manipuri, Nepali, Oriya, Punjabi, Sanskrit, Sindhi, Tamil, Telugu and
Urdu.
Economic Variables:The primary source for data on state income is an annual
government publication Estimates of State Domestic Product (Department of Statis-
tics, Department of Statistics, Ministry of Planning). The primary source for the
Consumer Price Index for Agricultural Laborers (CPIAL) and Consumer Price In-
dex for Industrial Workers (CPIIW) which are used to deßate agricultural and non-
agricultural components of state domestic product respectively is a number of Gov-
ernment of India publications which include Indian Labour Handbook, the Indian
Labour Journal, the Indian Labour Gazette and the Reserve Bank of India Report
on Currency and Finance. Ozler, Datt and Ravallion (1996) have further corrected
CPIAL and CPIIW to take account of inter-state cost of living diﬀerentials and have
also adjusted CPIAL to take account of rising Þrewood prices. Using their data al-
lows us to put together a consistent and complete series on real total state income for
the period 1960 to 1992. Our measures of urbanization and population density are
respectively the ratio of urban to total population and total state population divided
by state land area. Population information comes from the 1951, 1961, 1971, 1981
and 1991 censuses (Census of India, Registrar General and Census Commissioner,
Government of India) and has been interpolated between census years.
34See the Appendix Table for a deÞnition of what parties are included under each of these group-
ings.
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Literacy: Literacy data broken down by gender comes from the 1951, 1961, 1971,
1981 and 1991 Indian censuses (Census of India, Registrar General and Census Com-
missioner, Government of India) and has been interpolated between census years.
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TABLE  1
SUMMARY OF MAIN VARIABLES
State Public Food
Distribution Per
Capita
Calamity Relief
Expenditure Share
 In Net State
Domestic Income
Electoral
turnout in
state
elections
Political
competitiveness
Proportion Of
Scheduled
Caste/ Tribe In
Population
Total Food
Grain
Production Per
Capita
Real Per
Capita Value
of Crop
Affected
Newspaper/
Periodical
Circulation Per
Capita
Other
Newspapers
Circulation
Per Capita
English
Newspapers
Circulation
Per Capita
Hindi
Newspapers
Circulation
Per Capita
Andhra
Pradesh
11.615
(9.012)
0.414
(0.357)
68.719
(3.515)
0.558
(0.113)
0.191
(0.021)
185.851
(18.448)
8.252
(14.937)
0.029
(0.011)
0.0299
(0.012)
0.003
(0.001)
0.001
(0.001)
Assam 24.681
(7.632)
0.395
(0.296)
62.978
(11.530)
0.552
(0.241)
0.209
(0.026)
150.402
(12.973)
10.802
(11.729)
0.0186
(0.009)
0.0135
(0.007)
0.003
(0.002)
0.001
(0.001)
Bihar 11.110
(6.001)
0.249
(0.246)
51.764
(5.903)
0.454
(0.136)
0.222
(0.0129)
141.008
(19.695)
6.724
(9.177)
0.020
(0.012)
0.003
(0.002)
0.002
(0.001)
0.014
(0.011)
Gujarat 18.576
 (10.512)
0.485
(0.462)
55.906
(5.678)
0.568
 (0.253)
0.212
(0.008)
118.376
(30.598)
3.599
(6.285)
0.054
(0.008)
0.053
(0.009)
0.002
(0.001)
0.0005
(0.0004)
Haryana 9.813
(4.081)
0.190
(0.127)
67.431
(5.108)
0.541
  (0.237)
0.193
(0.003)
467.687
(99.335)
8.799
(15.280)
0.020
(0.005)
0.004
(0.002)
0.004
(0.004)
0.013
(0.005)
Jammu &
Kashmir
42.690
(11.219)
0.313
(0.443)
68.964
(5.533)
0.547
(0.280)
0.081
(0.004)
191.525
(30.503)
3.871
(12.672)
0.026
(0.010)
0.022
(0.006)
0.004
(0.003)
0.001
(0.001)
Karnataka 15.368
(7.774)
0.175
(0.256)
63.372
(5.825)
0.587
  (0.216)
0.167
(0.030)
180.081
(24.588)
0.485
(1.844)
0.047
(0.014)
0.045
(0.012)
0.008
(0.002)
0.001
(0.001)
Kerala 45.979
(19.337)
0.178
(0.348)
77.572
(3.772)
0.152
 (0.123)
0.103
(0.007)
54.886
(10.324)
3.607
(7.715)
0.151
(0.060)
0.162
(0.064)
0.004
(0.003)
0.001
(0.001)
Madhya
Pradesh
7.564
(5.333)
0.198
(0.330)
49.089
(6.056)
0.531
   (0.145)
0.354
(0.020)
255.743
(31.733)
0.552
(2.300)
0.0225
(0.017)
0.0004
(0.002)
0.001
(0.002)
0.020
(0.017)
Maharashtra 28.271
(8.617)
0.253
(0.569)
59.347
 (4.384)
0.674
  (0.183)
0.147
(0.032)
147.700
(29.260)
0.339
(0.695)
0.117
(0.017)
0.055
(0.007)
0.0480
(0.015)
0.016
(0.008)
Orissa 10.944
(5.082)
0.580
(0.727)
44.939
(7.490)
0.413
 (0.255)
0.385
(0.008)
222.052
(31.243)
5.604
(8.093)
0.016
(0.010)
0.018
(0.011)
0.001
(0.0005)
0.0004
(0.0005)
Punjab 15.952
(12.328)
0.253
(0.418)
66.139
(4.077)
0.384
(0.223)
0.290
(0.039)
668.551
(206.580)
9.946
(19.041)
0.058
(0.019)
0.045
(0.014)
0.004
(0.003)
0.012
(0.007)
Rajasthan 10.209
(8.765)
0.711
(1.011)
52.991
(6.219)
0.454
(0.197)
0.287
(0.008)
229.405
(45.251)
2.188
(4.649)
0.032
(0.016)
0.003
(0.001)
0.001
(0.003)
0.027
(0.018)
Tamil Nadu 21.243
(11.344)
0.157
(0.166)
69.700
(4.160)
0.554
(0.141)
0.192
(0.006)
150.917
(17.887)
1.007
(2.407)
0.116
(0.016)
0.095
(0.015)
0.018
(0.005)
0.004
(0.004)
Uttar
Pradesh
8.106
(3.368)
0.168
(0.138)
52.075
(6.033)
0.477
 (0.165)
0.218
(0.008)
213.085
(33.443)
9.727
(10.255)
0.035
(0.013)
0.005
(0.001)
0.003
(0.001)
0.028
(0.012)
West Bengal 34.504
(10.718)
0.291
(0.161)
66.506
(8.728)
0.452
  (0.127)
0.253
(0.031)
159.934
(18.859)
7.972
(11.168)
0.070
(0.015)
0.042
(0.012)
0.019
(0.004)
0.008
 (0.003)
TOTAL 19.774
(15.191)
0.315
(0.468)
60.955
(10.793)
0.492
(0.224)
0.221
(0.081)
218.182
(154.980)
5.245
(10.526)
0.053
(0.045)
0.034
(0.041)
0.008
(0.013)
0.011
(0.013)
Standard deviations in parenthesis. See the Data Appendix for detail on construction and sources of variables.
TABLE 2
SHOCKS AND GOVERNMENT RESPONSIVENESS IN INDIA: 1958 - 1992
public food distribution per capita calamity relief expenditure share
in net state domestic income
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Model
total food grain production
per capita
-0.024
(-2.96)
0.0004
(0.49)
food shock dummy 3.462
(4.48)
real per capita value of
crop affected [CROP]
0.033
(0.86)
0.013
(6.93)
0.013
(6.79)
0-25% food production 5.301
(2.51)
25-50% food production 4.277
(2.03)
50-75% food production 2.579
(1.22)
75-100% food production 0.110
(0.05)
0-25% CROP -0.446
(3.14)
25-50% CROP -0.541
(4.11)
50-75% CROP -0.504
(3.75)
75-100% CROP -0.348
(2.53)
state effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
year effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Number of observations 492 512 512 459 491 491
F test
(p-value)
7.67
(0.00)
2.91
(0.034)
adjusted R-squared 0.72 0.72 0.71 0.22 0.20 0.22
Notes: t statistics in parentheses. See the Data Appendix for details on the construction and sources of the
variables. Columns (2) and (5) contain dummies which measure whether the observation of  food grain
production or crop damage for a particular state and year is in the 0-25, 25-50, 50-75 or 75-100 percentile
of the state specific distribution of these variables.  F tests for the equality of these four coefficients are
reported at the bottom of columns (2) and (5) capture whether In column (3) the food shock dummy takes
a value of 1 if food grain production per capita in a given year falls below the state specific median
averaged over the 1958-1992 period and a value of  0 otherwise.
TABLE 3
DETERMINANTS OF RESPONSIVENESS: BASIC RESULTS
public food
distribution per capita
calamity relief expenditure
in net state domestic
income share
Model (1) (2) (3) (4)
food shock dummy 3.641
(4.28)
3.548
(4.24)
real per capita value of
crop affected [CROP]
0.012
(6.33)
0.012
(7.08)
newspaper circulation
per capita
94.30
(3.41)
3.528
(2.04)
turnout [t-1] -0.114
(1.67)
0.003
(0.97)
political
competitiveness
-4.981
(2.86)
-0.087
(0.69)
proportion of
scheduled caste/tribe
in population
-2.231
(0.09)
-1.721
(0.69)
pre or election year
dummy
2.754
(2.70)
-0.013
(0.30)
log net state domestic
income
5.271
(1.04)
4.952
(0.97)
-0.733
(2.08)
-0.785
(2.10)
ratio of urban to total
population
126.6
(2.36)
74.21
(1.31)
-0.206
(0.12)
-0.623
(0.27)
population density -10.73
(0.57)
-23.39
(1.47)
-0.195
(0.30)
-0.641
(0.96)
state effects YES YES YES YES
year effects YES YES YES YES
number of
observations
476 471 491 486
adjusted R2 0.74 0.76 0.23 0.24
Notes: t statistics in parentheses. See the Data Appendix for details on the construction and sources of the
variables. In columns (1) and (2) the food shock dummy takes a value of 1 if food grain production per
capita in a given year falls below the state specific median averaged over the 1958-1992 period and a
value of 0 otherwise.
TABLE 4
POLITICS AND RESPONSIVENESS
Public food distribution per capita calamity relief expenditure in net state
domestic income share
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
food shock dummy 2.523
(3.02)
2.819
(3.27)
2.671
(3.24)
4.139
(4.77)
real per capita value of
crop affected [CROP]
-0.011
(1.00)
0.014
(3.71)
0.025
(4.78)
0.013
(6.50)
newspaper circulation
per capita
95.47
(3.49)
95.43
(3.46)
97.83
(3.54)
 96.49
(3.49)
3.265
(1.95)
3.475
(2.06)
3.335
(2.11)
3.519
(2.05)
turnout [t-1] -0.115
(1.69)
-0.118
(1.73)
-0.112
(1.66)
-0.116
(1.68)
0.0007
(0.21)
0.003
(0.94)
0.002
(0.78)
0.003
(0.98)
(turnout [t-1])*
(deviation of food
production from median
[FOOD])
0.0003
(2.13)
(turnout [t-1])* CROP 0.0004
(2.16)
political
competitiveness
-4.92
(2.80)
-5.034
(2.86)
-4.906
(2.79)
-4.993
(2.90)
-0.089
(0.72)
-0.055
(0.40)
-0.090
(0.73)
-0.085
(0.67)
(political
competitiveness)* FOOD
0.033
(1.25)
(political
competitiveness)* CROP
-0.0051
(0.66)
proportion of
scheduled caste/tribe in
population
-19.47
(0.79)
-12.88
(0.53)
-19.90
(0.82)
5.865
(0.25)
-1.451
(1.12)
-1.607
(1.20)
-0.896
(0.70)
-1.728
(1.28)
(proportion of
scheduled caste/tribe in
population)* FOOD
0.069
(1.97)
(proportion of
scheduled caste/tribe in
population)* CROP
-0.059
(2.43)
pre or election year
dummy
2.498
(2.41)
2.59
(2.49)
2.531
(2.44)
2.711
(2.69)
-0.020
(0.44)
-0.012
(0.28)
-0.018
(0.42)
-0.009
(0.18)
(pre or election year
dummy)*FOOD
-0.024
(0.89)
(pre or election year
dummy)*CROP
-0.0008
(0.24)
log net state domestic
income
7.617
(1.47)
7.326
(1.40)
7.724
(1.48)
4.385
(0.85)
-0.794
(2.12)
-0.784
(2.09)
-0.783
(2.09)
-0.784
(2.09)
ratio of urban to total
population
83.69
(1.54)
80.62
(1.45)
82.30
(1.51)
65.62
(1.15)
-0.607
(0.26)
-0.723
(0.31)
-1.213
(0.52)
-0.604
(0.26)
population density -18.23
(1.15)
-19.25
(1.19)
-18.24
(1.15)
-26.71
(1.64)
-0.630
(0.94)
-0.653
(0.97)
0.615
(0.94)
-0.648
(0.97)
state effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
year effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
number of
observations
471 471 471 471 486 486 486 486
adjusted R2 0.77 0.76 0.77 0.76 0.25 0.24 0.25 0.24
Notes: t statistics in parentheses. See the Data Appendix for details on the construction and sources of the
variables. The food shock dummy takes a value of 1 if food grain production per capita in a given year
falls below the state specific median averaged over the 1958-1992 period and a value of 0 otherwise. For
the interaction terms the food shock variable (FOOD) we use is the annual deviation of food grain
production per capita from the state specific median value for the period 1958-1992
TABLE 5
NEWSPAPERS AND RESPONSIVENESS
public food distribution per
capita
calamity relief expenditure
share
 in net state domestic income
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
        food shock dummy 2.17
(2.66)
3.01
(3.58)
1.91
(2.27)
real per capita value of crop affected
[CROP]
0.007
(2.46)
0.012
(7.09)
0.010
(3.09)
newspaper circulation per capita 96.36
(3.54)
2.285
(1.81)
(newspaper circulation per capita)*
(deviation of food production from
median [FOOD])
0.445
(4.23)
(newspaper circulation per capita)*
CROP
0.113
(2.34)
English newspapers circulation per
capita
61.18
(0.68)
41.76
(0.48)
3.218
(0.68)
4.267
(0.89)
Hindi newspapers circulation per
capita
-57.87
(1.23)
-45.82
(1.00)
-3.624
(1.10)
-4.105
(1.18)
Other newspapers circulation per
capita
118.8
(3.49)
122.7
(3.49)
4.177
(2.23)
2.527
(1.88)
(English newspapers circulation per
capita)* FOOD
-0.293
(0.33)
(Hindi newspapers circulation per
capita)* FOOD
0.037
(0.05)
(Other newspapers circulation per
capita)* FOOD
0.571
(2.58)
(English newspapers circulation per
capita)* CROP
-0.355
(1.12)
(Hindi newspapers circulation per
capita)* CROP
0.032
(0.24)
(Other newspapers circulation per
capita)* CROP
0.129
(2.44)
economic controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
political controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
state effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
year effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
number of observations 471 467 467 486 482 482
adjusted R2 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.25 0.25 0.25
Notes: t statistics in parentheses. See the Data Appendix for details on the construction and sources of the
variables. The food shock dummy takes a value of 1 if food grain production per capita in a given year
falls below the state specific median averaged over the 1958-1992 period and a value of 0 otherwise. For
the interaction terms the food shock variable (FOOD) we use is the annual deviation of food grain
production per capita from the state specific median value for the period 1958-1992. “Other” captures
circulation of newspapers published in languages other than English or Hindi.
TABLE 6
NEWSPAPERS AND RESPONSIVENESS: INSTRUMENTING WITH LITERACY
Public food distribution
per capita
Calamity relief expenditure
share
 in net state domestic
income
Model (1) (2) (3) (4)
food shock dummy 2.66
(2.22)
2.10
(1.96)
real per capita value of crop
affected [CROP]
0.009
(4.02)
0.010
(5.23)
newspapers circulation per
capita
201.5
(0.92)
16.08
(2.19)
other newspapers circulation
per capita
236.2
(2.51)
10.51
(2.62)
turnout [t-1] -0.088
(0.99)
-0.102
(1.14)
0.007
(1.53)
0.005
(1.20)
political competitiveness -2.850
(1.34)
-2.330
(1.11)
0.025
(0.17)
0.008
(0.06)
proportion of scheduled
caste/tribe in population
16.06
(0.42)
5.113
(0.18)
-0.706
(0.47)
-1.906
(1.34)
pre or election year dummy 3.580
(2.93)
3.558
(2.92)
-0.023
(0.42)
-0.030
(0.62)
log net state domestic income 1.845
(0.25)
-4.374
(0.72)
-0.774
(2.00)
-1.056
(2.46)
ratio of urban to total
population
37.39
(0.22)
0.252
(0.002)
-6.429
(1.08)
-3.144
(0.87)
population density -40.88
(0.83)
-57.56
(2.04)
-2.578
(1.38)
-1.680
(1.37)
state effects YES YES YES YES
year effects YES YES YES YES
F-test for first stage
(Prob > F)
30.94
(0.00)
34.38
(0.00)
3.96
(0.00)
4.52
(0.00)
overidentification test p-value 0.66 0.96 0.95 0.99
number of observations 414 410 433 429
R2 0.77 0.77 0.23 0.33
Notes: t statistics in parentheses. See the Data Appendix for details on the construction and sources of the
variables. The food shock dummy takes a value of 1 if food grain production per capita in a given year
falls below the state specific median averaged over the 1958-1992 period and a value of 0 otherwise. In
columns (1) and (2) newspaper circulation per capita is instrumented using male and female literacy rates
for the population above 15 years of age which has been interpolated between census years. The F test for
the joint significance of male and female literacy in the first stage regression explaining newspaper
circulation is given at the base of the table. The overidentification test we employ is due to Sargan [1958].
The number of observations times the R-squared from the regression of the stage two residuals on the
instruments is distributed  χ2 (T +1) where T is the number of instruments.
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APPENDIX TABLE
POLTICAL COMPETITION IN INDIAN STATES 1958-1992
State Nature and timing of political competition
Andhra Pradesh 1958-1983: Congress versus Janata Parties
1984-1992: Congress versus Regional Parties
Assam 1958-1984: Congress versus Janata Parties
1985-1992: Congress versus Regional Parties
Bihar 1958-1992: Congress versus Janata Parties
Gujarat 1958-1992: Congress versus Janata Parties
Haryana 1958-1992: Congress versus Janata Parties
Jammu & Kashmir 1958-1992: Congress versus Regional Parties
Karnataka 1958-1992: Congress versus Janata Parties
Kerala 1958-1992: Congress versus Hard Left Parties
Madhya Pradesh 1958-1992: Congress versus Hindu Parties
Maharashtra 1958-1992: Congress versus Janata Parties
Orissa 1958-1976: Congress versus Regional Parties
1977-1992: Congress versus Janata Parties
Punjab 1958-1992: Congress versus Regional Parties
Rajasthan 1958-1979: Congress versus Janata Parties
1980-1992: Congress versus Hindu Parties
Tamil Nadu 1958-1992: Congress versus Regional Parties
Uttar Pradesh 1958-1990: Congress versus Janata Parties
1991-1992: Congress versus Hindu Parties
West Bengal 1958-1992: Congress versus Hard Left Parties
Notes: Congress Parties includes Indian National Congress, Indian National Congree Urs and Indian
National Congress Socialist Parties. Janata parties includes Janata, Janata Dal and Lok Dal Parties.
Hard Left Parties includes Communist Party of India and Communist Party of India Marxist Parties.
Hindu Parties includes the Bharatiya Janata Party. Regional Parties include Telugu Desam,  Asom
Gana Parishad, Jammu & Kashmir National Congress, Shiv Sena, Uktal Congress, Shiromani Alkali
Dal and “other” Regional Parties, only one of which is active in a particular state.
